Introduction
Security and privacy of embedded systems have been center of attention in research and teaching whose compromise has direct organizational, societal, and economical adverse effects. Embedded systems in critical infrastructures, smart homes, smart fabrics, and similar smart platforms need to be secure to transfer data in private manner. Medical devices, e.g., implantable and wearable medical devices (IWMDs) which are commonly used for diagnosing, monitoring, and treating various medical conditions, are among the most critical smart platforms. Similar to other emerging usage models, a general trend is toward increased functional complexity and connectivity, resulting in larger attack surface. The growing number of instances of security breaches in the last few years in such extremely sensitive usage models has created a compelling case for efforts towards securing such systems 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 , and refining new research and teaching trends 7, 8 . Deeply-embedded systems such as medical devices will dominate the future of traditional embedded systems and will likely get wide-spread adoption about 100 times more compared to traditional desktops.
IWMDs are generally categorized into 16 groups by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA): anesthesiology; cardiovascular; clinical chemistry and clinical toxicology; dental; ear, nose, and throat; gastroenterology and urology; general and plastic surgery; general hospital and personal use; hematology and pathology; immunology and microbiology; neurology; obstetric and gynaecologic; opthalmic; orthopedic; physical medicine; and radiology 9 . Many of such devices are able to communicate through wireless means. These, unlike traditional embedded systems, have three distinct characteristics, differentiating them from the traditional ones. First, such IWMDs are embedded deeply into human bodies, e.g., cardiovascular defibrillators embedded into human bodies which perform therapeutic tasks or Glucose Monitor and Insulin Pump monitoring pairs which are used for diagnosis and therapy. A security breach here is lifethreatening and unlike traditional embedded systems such as smart cards in which financial loss is the result of the breach, here, catastrophic and vitally-adverse problems are inevitable. Second, they are already developed and in wide-spread use and any change to provide security would require tremendous efforts. Third, the area/delay/power consumption and, in general, the implementation and performance metrics of these devices cannot, in most of the cases, tolerate the burden of the cryptographic algorithms used for traditional embedded systems. Specifically, for both hardware through application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and fieldprogrammable gate arrays (FPGAs), and software through microcontrollers, the potential unacceptable degradation of performance and implementation metrics is a meaningful concern for medical devices security. For instance, if the security protection schemes for a pacemaker (typically battery-powered to perform medical tasks for years) lead to its battery depletion in months instead of years, the resulting secure device would be life-threatening and impractical.
Contributions
There have been previous efforts for integrating research and teaching in traditional systems; nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, a practical solution and an effective assessment strategy have not been adopted for emerging usage models integration such as IWMDs. Our pedagogical hypothesis is that emerging security research (through cryptographic solutions) can be integrated in university education considering three teaching and learning approaches; (a). Developing a respective multi-disciplinary laboratory (engineering, mathematics, and biomedicine in particular) for both research and teaching, (b). Advancing education through inter-and intra-university research collaborations in the aforementioned fields, and (c). Assessing the outcome through detailed benchmarks. The authors of this work are from different and diverse backgrounds and have prior expertise in the topic proposed (both teaching and research) and have been with world-known security and cryptography groups. This project is addressing the respective tradeoffs between the IWMDs security levels and affording the overheads. To meet this objective, we have used such methodology for two years in educating graduate students and brought them very well up to speed which resulted in successful research (publications in top-tier electrical and computer engineering IEEE Transactions journals for the case study of fault analysis attacks).
The assessment strategy for the proposed integration is two-fold. A pilot project is developed (through work of undergraduate and graduate students) for testing the pedagogy in three phases: (a) education, (b) research, and (c) integration. The education phase takes into account the multidisciplinary aspects of the project and in the research phase, publishing through the outcomes of the education phase is the priority. Security integration assessment is based on the resources in the already-developed laboratory.
Programming languages, especially hardware description languages of cryptographic algorithms developed in the courses, are used as final projects. The evaluation of success of integration of research and teaching is performed by a group of research/teaching faculty members with diverse departments. The results will be placed on the world-wide web for advancing global education and with the aim of possible improvement from both research and education communities. The eventual outcome of this integration is a step-forward to fill the current gap of emerging security teaching/research integration for IWMDs.
We have had the following goals in such integration:
(a) Assess and benchmark the complications in IWMDs security and privacy; (b) Evaluate co-design for hardware and software platforms teaching and research integration. Indeed, in previous work, co-design architectures through symmetric key block ciphers have been evaluated 10 , motion control robots have been implemented 11 , and co-design education has been researched 12 ); (c) IWMDs, and in general, deeply-embedded systems security teaching and research challenges and complications benchmark in practice through developing a respective multi-disciplinary laboratory; and (d) Rochester Institute of Technology-based collaboration as well as inter-university research work for advancing education with respect to IWMDs security and privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related to IWMDs, we present topics needed for cryptographic engineering research and teaching integration. Furthermore, the methodology for integration is explained through a case study, covering both the challenges for the experimented studies and the routes to dissolve them. Finally, we summarize the paper.
Essential (Sub)-Topics for Research/Teaching
It is known that there exist select resources specifically suitable for embedded systems security education 13, 14 , nevertheless, medical devices (IWMDs) security challenges have not been subject of specific readings for educational purposes, to the best of authors' knowledge. To provide select topics and sub-topics (the list includes select items but it does not confine the approach and can be broadened) required for cryptographic engineering used for IWMDs security research/teaching integration, we would like to first differentiate the materials used in embedded security courses 15, 16 and the ones specific to IWMDs. Table 1 presents select topics considered in the integration process.
Because the main objective of this paper is integration of research and teaching related to IWMDs security, we exclude the topics used for education purposes only and are not the results of our prior research work. However, it is useful to note that a specific graduate or undergraduate level course in IWMDs systems security (and thus a potential textbook) may have a number of readings/chapters, i.e., the select topics in Table 1 in addition to, typically, an Introduction and a Discussion. Level of readers in such course/reading needs to be taken into account (undergraduate-or graduate-level, for instance) and, accordingly, needs to be tailored noting different considerations including real-world examples for IWMDs (to encourage the students and give them the context within different medical fields), references to the state-of-the-art IWMDs security mechanisms and respective solutions (for undergraduate students, specifically, to encourage graduate-level studies), platforms for hardware [ASIC/FPGA from different vendors such as Xilinx/Altera/Synopsys tools, to name a few] and software (free-of-charge platform tools for simulations/syntheses/implementations, for instance), to name a few. 
Fault Analysis Attacks: Integration of Research and Teaching
Implementation attacks which are based on retrieving secret information from an implemented secure cryptographic algorithm are one of the major threats for such devices. In general, such attacks could be based on active measures (in which the device is modified, i.e., through active attacks, such as fault attacks, or through passive listening to the side-channels, such as power analysis attacks. Specifically, in fault analysis attacks, faults are injected and information is derived whereas in power analysis attacks, one would only listen to what is leaked, for example power traces. To present the results of our IWMDs security teaching and research integration, we have used "side-channel analysis attacks" as our topic. As mentioned, these are based on information gained from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem (on hardware or software), rather than brute force or theoretical weaknesses. As another example, cache timing information can provide an extra source of information which can be exploited to break the system.
The reason for selecting fault analysis attacks for providing our methodology is that, as seen in Table 1 , this topic is related to many other topics, allowing us to cover a large number of subtopics used for integration. Table 2 lists this relation (sub-topics are directly related whereas related other topics are related indirectly). 
Main
Step 1. Identifying the Education Challenges: Two of the authors supervise students whose research focus is security and reliability (specifically fault diagnosis and tolerance in hardware). Fault analysis attacks (active side-channel attacks) topic through fault injection has been selected.
One of the main goals of this phase was to expose the challenges of IWMDs systems security education as follows:
-The first challenge was to find resources directly related to IWMDs security education which is an emerging topic. Some important resources are: USENIX Enigma conference (a new conference on emerging threats and novel attacks), -The second challenge was that the topic chosen is, in nature, multi-disciplinary. The expertise of authors in these topics helped filling the gap in cases where students were not acquainted with the field of study. The instructors (authors of this work) also consulted with faculty members from other departments (especially computer science and mathematics) to meet the teaching objectives.
Main Step 2. Research and Development:
Fault analysis is an active sub-variant for sidechannel attacks. In such implementation attacks, faults are injected maliciously (attackers want to inject transient faults not to break the system, so their plan is intentionally injecting faults into the architectures of crypto-systems to retrieve as much leaked sensitive information as possible).
With respect to IWMDs, for instance, a pacemaker containing an embedded hard processor, high temperature, unsupported supply voltage or current, excessively high overclocking, strong electric or magnetic fields, or ionizing radiation, are all the ways to assert faults to influence the operation of the processor (here the processor is an ASIC architecture typically; yet, FPGAs containing the designs of cryptographic algorithms can very similarly be attacked).
Let us divide the research and development into two parts. Many error detection schemes have been proposed to defend against fault analysis attacks. We have followed the teaching tasks as seen in the flowchart of Fig. 2 , including three sub-parts: (a) error control coding, (b) error injection simulations for error coverage derivation for single/multiple stuck-at zero/one, and (c) FPGA/ASIC implementations to derive the overheads.
Finally, we have given three sub-cases to the students: (a) low-complexity block ciphers which are more lightweight than the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), (b) public-key cryptography with the case elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC), and (c) non-cryptography computer arithmetic architectures (e.g., CORDIC and Viterbi algorithms) whose reliability assurance is critical. Engaging students in non-traditional learning activities: For understanding the IWMDs security, this step is pivotal. There are a number of sub-steps needed for this main step: -Asking students to read research papers (venues include both security and medical domains) to explain the core of research on IWMDs security, -Contacting the authors of research papers, when needed, and -Conducting discussion sessions to share the learning materials and hard/soft skills
Main Step 3. Integration of Research and

Comparison of traditional embedded security and IWMDs security:
The second sub-step was to contrast traditional embedded security and IWMDs security based on the differences between these two. Fig. 3 shows the major differences taught to the students (IWMDs vs. traditional embedded systems security). This is a step-forward towards integration of emerging cryptographic engineering teaching and research.
Why IWMDs security is different?
-Both privacy-wise and security-wise are very sensitive compared to traditional systems. Here we talk about life-threatening adverse effects.
-Security solutions for traditional embedded systems may not be applicable or may not suffice.
-IWMDs and respective medical systems may have transient usage patterns, where access privileges need to be defined over time and space, not just by the user.
-For IWMDs, it might be impractical for users to explicitly perform system administration tasks such as security patching, etc.
-Cryptographic solutions add much overhead and are thus impractical.
-Danger of battery-depletion is far more than traditional systems.
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Figure 3. Traditional vs. IWMDs security (comparison for teaching and research integration).
Identifying the modularity of different cryptographic algorithms: These include algorithms such as SHA3 and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The sub-step includes applying fault diagnosis and tolerance techniques specified for IWMDs. Fig. 4 shows the first part of an S-box structure for the Pomaranch cipher. The structure of Pomaranch is based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) which allow fast implementation and produce sequences with large period if the feedback polynomial is chosen appropriately (often clock controlled for complexity induction and used in conjunction with "jumping" to increase the efficiency and reach a CJCSG structure). The operations used in composite fields include addition, multiplication (including multiplication with constant), squaring, cubing, and inversion in GF (2 3 ). The architecture of the substitution box in Fig. 4 includes a first sub-part which contains the transformation matrix M whose input is shown by X in GF (2 9 ) to get an output of A in GF( (2 3 ) 3 ).
Composite fields can be utilized to realize the substitution box to achieve low-complexity architectures. In Pomaranch, the two most and least significant bits are discarded to get to the uneven structure of the substitution box of Pomaranch. We already have a security laboratory and the security assessment is based on the resources in the already-developed "Applied Cryptography" laboratory. The form of outcome of the assessment will be mostly in programming languages specially hardware description languages of cryptographic algorithms developed as final projects. It is worth mentioning that the authors of this work have extensive background on fault detection and tolerance in many fields including cryptography [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . Moreover, in the fields of computer arithmetic and cryptographic engineering, they have prior expertise [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] .
Integration Problems for Teaching and Research of IWMDs
The problems, challenges, and complications during the course of the integration have been resolved. In what follows, through three instances, we present some of them.
IWMDs and fault detection and tolerance with respect to cryptography have broad theory. This includes time/hardware/hybrid redundancies. Books and readings as well as conference/journal papers have been used for instruction of students. Nevertheless, we note that just trying random faults will not be helpful in breaking most ciphers. As such, error detection approaches based on recomputing with encoded operands for both transient and permanent faults can be used, for instance, as a remedy. The attackers might use entropy-aware injections to bypass the solutions. Through the research work done in 2013-2015, we refined the approaches to have specific applicability to fault attacks.
Simulation-based assessments through single/multiple stuck-at zero/one, transient and permanent faults are a major part of fault diagnosis and tolerance in cryptography. Single stuck-at fault injection is usually done for assessing the effectiveness of the proposed fault diagnose methods. Nevertheless, the injection locations depend on the specific problem to solve, e.g., Pomaranch, Sha-3, or ECC architectures.
A challenge here is that the integration of research and teaching becomes very applicationspecific and dynamic with respect to error simulations. There are two methods, in general, for assessing the fault coverage of the designs. The choice of hardware or software based injections through C++ or LFSRs is an important step to take. These application specific choices make the integration of "simulation" step as a number of general guidelines rather than specific schemes.
The complications in the implementation step usually relate to the ASIC and FPGA tools and hardware. Specifically, for IWMDs, if ASIC is used as the hardware platform, Synopsys tools are used for implementations to derive the metrics (Design Compiler, PrimeTime PX, and the like). For FPGAs, Xilinx Vivado and Altera Quartus II are utilized.
Discussions and Conclusions
We have observed increased student engagement and deeper understanding through inquiry-led learning of fundamentals of IWMDs security. Moreover, it certainly helped generating additional research output/knowledge creation and strengthened pathways to postgraduate research (we are currently working on a number of IEEE Transactions journal papers and related conference papers as a result of such creation).
We also believe that linkage of research and teaching in academic work is beneficial for the departments the authors are affiliated with. Students become knowledge workers and are engaged in concept of the provisionality of existing knowledge. Overall, the students were satisfied with the integration outcome and also their publications progress.
Data management has been a pivotal part of this integration, noting that the results are useful for advancing global education and with the aim of possible improvement from both research and education communities.
In this paper, for IWMDs security research and teaching integration, new methods considering their complications are presented. We have presented the results of two years of implementing the presented strategy at graduate-level through fault attacks of Pomaranch case study. The results of the presented work show the success of the presented work while pinpointing the challenges encountered compared to traditional embedded system security research/teaching integration. We were successful in exposing the challenges of IWMDs security education through working closely with a number of students in the areas of cryptographic engineering and general reliability. Finally, inter-and intra-university research collaborations were initiated. These help us towards future directions of such integration, e.g., post-quantum cryptography.
